I'm not clear on what you're saying here, Spaceweaver. You wrote,
Indexical is a linguistic perhaps a poetic concept. But in the light of realism, this indexical carries profound differences
What "realism" are you referring to here? If it's Genuine Modal Realism, which the post is about, then you have things backwards. Lewis' idea was to deny any ontological privelege for the actual world, so "the actual" is linguistically indexical and the actual is an epistemically egocentric understanding of reality or "logical space".
In your point 1 you assert an egocentrically constructed understanding of the actual world which does not contradict Lewis' stance set out in the original post.
In 2, you seem to be describing the nature of "actuality" as an indexical term, you don't establish a real ontological privelege for our world, only a perceived one. There are possible worlds inhabited by people saying exactly the same thing as you and being exactly as right as you are.
Now, in response to obvious, there is, I think, an argument for point 6 of the MIND theory in the post, with some adjustment of 5. No time for that right now , unfortunately...
I'm not sure that arguing with Lewis is in line with the spirit of this post, and I don't think a scientific approach to dismissing Lewisean possible worlds is going to go anywehere: most philosophers who don't like Lewisean possible world's try to reduce them to linguistic (as e.g. Lycan) or ersatz (as e.g. Plantinga) entities.
I'm not clear on what you're saying here, Spaceweaver. You wrote,
What "realism" are you referring to here? If it's Genuine Modal Realism, which the post is about, then you have things backwards. Lewis' idea was to deny any ontological privelege for the actual world, so "the actual" is linguistically indexical and the actual is an epistemically egocentric understanding of reality or "logical space".
In your point 1 you assert an egocentrically constructed understanding of the actual world which does not contradict Lewis' stance set out in the original post.
In 2, you seem to be describing the nature of "actuality" as an indexical term, you don't establish a real ontological privelege for our world, only a perceived one. There are possible worlds inhabited by people saying exactly the same thing as you and being exactly as right as you are.
Now, in response to obvious, there is, I think, an argument for point 6 of the MIND theory in the post, with some adjustment of 5. No time for that right now , unfortunately...