While this is a departure from the nomadism project I've been posting up here, I thought it would be all right to share this essay I just finished, on the ethics of community service.
The Ethics of Service
Y.J. Wu, 2009
Abstract
The aim is to demonstrate that the fundamentals of community service, as distinct from those of other forms of beneficence and helpfulness, make it necessary to understand that act as unethical. By drawing various distinctions to arrive at a definition of community service, and from that definition following a line of inquiry that explores the elements of community service, the paper demonstrates how service could be understood as unethical. From these statements then formulating a path towards an ethical form of community service, concluding with the necessity of recognizing community service as unethical.
Preface
The main idea of this paper, that community service initiatives are unethical, was first presented to a class in the United World College of Southeast Asia in late 2009. It was met with hostility—-not surprising as much of the school's ethos are built on the foundation of community service, a foundation this idea threatened to shake. However, in retrospect, the presentation was unorganized, and it is no wonder that my classmates reacted the way they did. After all, even as I sought to show how community service is unethical, I was not out to destroy that spirit. Rather, the ``denouncement" of service as unethical was just one step towards affirming the benefits of such acts.
Here, in this paper, I shall make another attempt at explaining my position. By first outlining the conditions under which community service is different from other forms of beneficence and general helpfulness, then exploring the ideas and foundations of community service, I hope to demonstrate that community service is unethical, while at the same time arguing that the benefits of service can be ``saved" or reclaimed from such a conclusion. This is not an attack on community service, but an exposition of this idea and a roadmap towards bettering community service initiatives.
Distinguishing Community Service
In this exposition, the term ``community service", abbreviated CS, will be restricted to activities which require interaction between an actor (the ``servicer") and another human being, hence referred to as the ``beneficiary" or ``client". CS is distinct from volunteerism in that it is not merely an altruistic act of offering a benefit to others, but is mandatory either explicitly or implicitly. This paper focuses on the community service required of students or adults, requirements that are either explicit (as in the case of graduation credits) or implicit (as in the case of university admissions, where CS is seen as a ``necessity" for entrance into prestigious schools). The term ``community service" is then slightly misleading, but will be kept as it is how these activities are still referred to.
A distinction has to be drawn between the performance of acts and services in common society and the performance of the same acts and services in the context of CS. For example, a student who helps a classmate in the classroom is acting in a different capacity from the same act of tutoring in the context of CS. This distinction lies in the difference in motives. Although certain ethicists will that motives are inconsequential, it is a distinction that has to be made. This difference in motives undoubtedly has an effect on the outcome of the action, and on the action itself. One cannot remove the intention from the act, for then the act collapses into itself with nothing to act against its inertia, and if intention is always tied inextricably with the act, a change in intention is then a change in the act as well. There is also a difference in the form of interaction between the two parties in each case. In the former, continuing with the example stated, it is an interaction between two parties in close standing. In the latter, there is a clear difference in the positions of the two parties involved. This idea of ``position" or ``status" will be a major factor in the demonstration that CS is unethical and as such has to be pointed out while distinguishing the form of CS that will be the focus of the demonstration.
This form of CS is distinct in that it is not a significant dedication of time to a party of beneficiaries. There is, of course, not objective scale which determines the number of hours per week, let's say, before one form of service is distinguished from another. However, there is a clear difference between being immersed among the beneficiaries for extended periods of time and interacting with the beneficiaries only for a few hours a week. The former would require an involvement with the daily lives of the beneficiaries, forcing the actor to feel and experience reality as they do. The latter, which characterizes the form of CS the paper deals with, does not require this at all, and the actors are allowed to live oblivious to the beneficiaries except for the duration of the service each week. It is not my position to criticize or place judgments—-this is merely a distinction that has to be made for the following exposition to be valid.
How Community Service is Unethical
With the above distinctions in mind, it becomes clear that CS is inherently unethical. But it is not enough to state that such a conclusion is obvious, for these are rather dangerous waters that we are treading. This section, then, will be dedicated to demonstrating that the concept of CS as distinguished above is unethical.
I will begin first by exposing the foundations of community service. Taking the definition of an unethical act to be indiscernible with objectivity, that is to say, taking the idea of an unethical act to be for each human being a different manifestation of a larger, ambiguous moral law, I cannot hope to give one such encompassing definition without having to delve into moral philosophy, which I am not qualified to do. Hence, it is a pragmatic choice to merely expose the act of CS in a way that facilitates the judgment of readers, so that a conclusion in accord with my statement may be reached without the troubling route of philosophical inquiry.
Beginning with the idea that the act of community service requires the subordination of one party under another. That is, one party always has to be of a lower position or status than the other, even if such positioning is merely a means of convenience. Even if such a difference in position were a minor matter, it will be the emphasis of all future interaction if the act is to be deemed an act of CS. This idea is not merely an assumption, but a requirement of the term. It is inherent within the very definition of CS explained in the previous section that one party always has to be of a higher position than the other. Even if the term ``service" implies that the one in the ``service" of the beneficiary is inferior, this state of interaction is only a result of the subordination at the outset of the act of CS. Hence, it can be stated with certainty that community service initiatives require the treatment of the ``beneficiary" as an inferior as opposed to the actor who has to be perceived as being in a position above the beneficiary in order to be effectively called upon for such an act of service.
Following this, it is clear that such a subordination causes the creation of a gulf between the actor and the beneficiary. As the very act of service requires such a subordination, the subordination in turn requires the distinction between two parties. One party, the actors, has to be seen in such a capacity and the other, the beneficiaries, are also trapped in their position. The actors are nothing more than actors, the beneficiaries are nothing more than beneficiaries. This distinction, a necessity, is the gulf that arises necessarily from the act of CS. And in fact, this is an irreconcilable gulf—-it is logically necessary so to overcome it will negate the very act of service in itself. With this gulf, the other party (for there will always be the Other party in such a situation) is unreachable, is inhuman and merely an object on the far side. From the other end, the situation is the same. For if the gulf cannot be negotiated, regardless of the true nature of those on the other side, they become nothing more than objects. Even if the aim of service (the ideal aim, it has to be said) is to help the others, and even if it may succeed, such an aim can only be carried out in the form of aid to a foreign object separate from the reality of the actor.
This next statement is unique to community service as I have defined it in the previous section. As CS in this paper refers to acts of service required explicitly or implicitly, the motives of the actors have to be questioned. Even if such motives are not exclusive, as in, the acts of CS could be motivated by actual altruistic feelings, my definition of CS in this paper requires the existence of such explicit and implicit requirements as outlined before. Such requirements mean that the beneficiaries are not the ends in themselves, that they are merely the means towards the accomplishment of certain ends the actors themselves are aware of. That awareness on the part of the actors is key. If the actors understand their motivations, then their actions within the CS will be affected by them. The effect is exacerbated by the notion that the motivations exist. The very engagement in CS by the actors, in the form of CS this paper is concerned with, is the recognition of these motivations and requirements, which in turn have an effect on the act itself, much like a circle that continually causes the effects of, and affects the causes of, its own existence.
From this recognition of the effects that motivations have on actions, one can conclude that the motivations which treat the beneficiaries as means and not as ends affect the actions in a way that inevitably reflects this. This is, then, a disrespecting of the beneficiaries who are not treated as beneficiaries for their own status as human beings (although a previous statement already precludes this possibility) but as beneficiaries for their status as ends towards accomplishing a goal. As already discussed, this definition of CS does not in any way negate certain purer motivations. Even if an actor performs the service with the best of all altruistic intentions, the very act of performing the service under the CS as defined earlier, with the recognition of certain explicit or implicit requirements set by other parties, causes this gulf and this treatment of the beneficiaries.
The aim of community service is to promote, to act on, to work towards the rights of the beneficiaries. Services that promote healthcare work on their rights to a good life, services that promote education work on their rights to education and opportunity, and so on. However, I see the act of CS to require a trespassing on the dignity of the beneficiaries. To provide for these rights, it is necessary, as shown previously, to subordinate the beneficiaries, which is an infringement of their dignity. Dignity and rights are mutually exclusive in the case of CS. One cannot promote the rights of the beneficiaries without trespassing on their dignity; one cannot respect their dignity without not acting on their rights. So, then, CS, which acts on their rights, has to infringe on their dignity, a necessary conclusion that can be drawn from the nature of CS as defined previously.
Towards an Ethical Form of Community Service
In the ``Preface", I stated that it is not my intention to launch an attack on community service and its ideals, rather, I wish to expose the limitations on the ethics of community service. Exposing the possible sources of unethical aspects of CS allows us to see where it is possible to promote these very ethics, to move towards an ethical form of community service.
A clearest route towards this ethical form is to offset these ethical problems with tangible benefits gained for the beneficiaries by the actors. The unethical aspects of CS as outlined are at their worst when the act of CS does nothing for the beneficiaries, for then such compromises with ethics and morality do not lead to any ends for the beneficiaries. That is, the beneficiaries are treated as ends when, and only when, the service is of benefit to them. If not, they are treated only as means towards accomplishing the requirements that predicate this form of service—-this treatment of the beneficiaries as means and not as ends is one of the worst of all ethical transgressions. The gulf that requires one party to view the other as objects is a necessity, but its obviously unethical nature can be overcome if the others are helped in some way; if the Other is helped, the objectification of this other is justified and does not need to be seen as completely unethical. In short, CS is only completely unethical if it is in itself an ends—-it can only be ethical if the unethical aspects of this act are means towards the obviously ethical ends of beneficence and helpfulness. Even as CS is distinct from these ethical forms of beneficence, it can be used as a means towards such forms, so that the inherent unethical nature of CS is justified and becomes a necessary tool towards an ethical treatment of the beneficiaries.
Conclusion
This paper, not meant to be ground-breaking in any way, is simply an explanation of my stance on community service and ethics. An exposition of this sort aims not to convert all readers to this point of view, but to open the possibility of drawing distinctions within such an issue that facilitates further investigations. With community service becoming such a social phenomenon in recent years, it is important to consider the ethics of such an act for the very reason that such consideration is a necessary step towards bettering community service initiatives. As all rational human beings strive to achieve within the moral and ethical laws, by exposing the reasoning behind the ethical importance of effectivecommunity service, it is my hope that community service efforts will become more self-aware and work towards such an ethical form, for the betterment of the beneficiaries and society.
The Ethics of Service
Y.J. Wu, 2009
Abstract
The aim is to demonstrate that the fundamentals of community service, as distinct from those of other forms of beneficence and helpfulness, make it necessary to understand that act as unethical. By drawing various distinctions to arrive at a definition of community service, and from that definition following a line of inquiry that explores the elements of community service, the paper demonstrates how service could be understood as unethical. From these statements then formulating a path towards an ethical form of community service, concluding with the necessity of recognizing community service as unethical.
Preface
The main idea of this paper, that community service initiatives are unethical, was first presented to a class in the United World College of Southeast Asia in late 2009. It was met with hostility—-not surprising as much of the school's ethos are built on the foundation of community service, a foundation this idea threatened to shake. However, in retrospect, the presentation was unorganized, and it is no wonder that my classmates reacted the way they did. After all, even as I sought to show how community service is unethical, I was not out to destroy that spirit. Rather, the ``denouncement" of service as unethical was just one step towards affirming the benefits of such acts.
Here, in this paper, I shall make another attempt at explaining my position. By first outlining the conditions under which community service is different from other forms of beneficence and general helpfulness, then exploring the ideas and foundations of community service, I hope to demonstrate that community service is unethical, while at the same time arguing that the benefits of service can be ``saved" or reclaimed from such a conclusion. This is not an attack on community service, but an exposition of this idea and a roadmap towards bettering community service initiatives.
Distinguishing Community Service
In this exposition, the term ``community service", abbreviated CS, will be restricted to activities which require interaction between an actor (the ``servicer") and another human being, hence referred to as the ``beneficiary" or ``client". CS is distinct from volunteerism in that it is not merely an altruistic act of offering a benefit to others, but is mandatory either explicitly or implicitly. This paper focuses on the community service required of students or adults, requirements that are either explicit (as in the case of graduation credits) or implicit (as in the case of university admissions, where CS is seen as a ``necessity" for entrance into prestigious schools). The term ``community service" is then slightly misleading, but will be kept as it is how these activities are still referred to.
A distinction has to be drawn between the performance of acts and services in common society and the performance of the same acts and services in the context of CS. For example, a student who helps a classmate in the classroom is acting in a different capacity from the same act of tutoring in the context of CS. This distinction lies in the difference in motives. Although certain ethicists will that motives are inconsequential, it is a distinction that has to be made. This difference in motives undoubtedly has an effect on the outcome of the action, and on the action itself. One cannot remove the intention from the act, for then the act collapses into itself with nothing to act against its inertia, and if intention is always tied inextricably with the act, a change in intention is then a change in the act as well. There is also a difference in the form of interaction between the two parties in each case. In the former, continuing with the example stated, it is an interaction between two parties in close standing. In the latter, there is a clear difference in the positions of the two parties involved. This idea of ``position" or ``status" will be a major factor in the demonstration that CS is unethical and as such has to be pointed out while distinguishing the form of CS that will be the focus of the demonstration.
This form of CS is distinct in that it is not a significant dedication of time to a party of beneficiaries. There is, of course, not objective scale which determines the number of hours per week, let's say, before one form of service is distinguished from another. However, there is a clear difference between being immersed among the beneficiaries for extended periods of time and interacting with the beneficiaries only for a few hours a week. The former would require an involvement with the daily lives of the beneficiaries, forcing the actor to feel and experience reality as they do. The latter, which characterizes the form of CS the paper deals with, does not require this at all, and the actors are allowed to live oblivious to the beneficiaries except for the duration of the service each week. It is not my position to criticize or place judgments—-this is merely a distinction that has to be made for the following exposition to be valid.
How Community Service is Unethical
With the above distinctions in mind, it becomes clear that CS is inherently unethical. But it is not enough to state that such a conclusion is obvious, for these are rather dangerous waters that we are treading. This section, then, will be dedicated to demonstrating that the concept of CS as distinguished above is unethical.
I will begin first by exposing the foundations of community service. Taking the definition of an unethical act to be indiscernible with objectivity, that is to say, taking the idea of an unethical act to be for each human being a different manifestation of a larger, ambiguous moral law, I cannot hope to give one such encompassing definition without having to delve into moral philosophy, which I am not qualified to do. Hence, it is a pragmatic choice to merely expose the act of CS in a way that facilitates the judgment of readers, so that a conclusion in accord with my statement may be reached without the troubling route of philosophical inquiry.
Beginning with the idea that the act of community service requires the subordination of one party under another. That is, one party always has to be of a lower position or status than the other, even if such positioning is merely a means of convenience. Even if such a difference in position were a minor matter, it will be the emphasis of all future interaction if the act is to be deemed an act of CS. This idea is not merely an assumption, but a requirement of the term. It is inherent within the very definition of CS explained in the previous section that one party always has to be of a higher position than the other. Even if the term ``service" implies that the one in the ``service" of the beneficiary is inferior, this state of interaction is only a result of the subordination at the outset of the act of CS. Hence, it can be stated with certainty that community service initiatives require the treatment of the ``beneficiary" as an inferior as opposed to the actor who has to be perceived as being in a position above the beneficiary in order to be effectively called upon for such an act of service.
Following this, it is clear that such a subordination causes the creation of a gulf between the actor and the beneficiary. As the very act of service requires such a subordination, the subordination in turn requires the distinction between two parties. One party, the actors, has to be seen in such a capacity and the other, the beneficiaries, are also trapped in their position. The actors are nothing more than actors, the beneficiaries are nothing more than beneficiaries. This distinction, a necessity, is the gulf that arises necessarily from the act of CS. And in fact, this is an irreconcilable gulf—-it is logically necessary so to overcome it will negate the very act of service in itself. With this gulf, the other party (for there will always be the Other party in such a situation) is unreachable, is inhuman and merely an object on the far side. From the other end, the situation is the same. For if the gulf cannot be negotiated, regardless of the true nature of those on the other side, they become nothing more than objects. Even if the aim of service (the ideal aim, it has to be said) is to help the others, and even if it may succeed, such an aim can only be carried out in the form of aid to a foreign object separate from the reality of the actor.
This next statement is unique to community service as I have defined it in the previous section. As CS in this paper refers to acts of service required explicitly or implicitly, the motives of the actors have to be questioned. Even if such motives are not exclusive, as in, the acts of CS could be motivated by actual altruistic feelings, my definition of CS in this paper requires the existence of such explicit and implicit requirements as outlined before. Such requirements mean that the beneficiaries are not the ends in themselves, that they are merely the means towards the accomplishment of certain ends the actors themselves are aware of. That awareness on the part of the actors is key. If the actors understand their motivations, then their actions within the CS will be affected by them. The effect is exacerbated by the notion that the motivations exist. The very engagement in CS by the actors, in the form of CS this paper is concerned with, is the recognition of these motivations and requirements, which in turn have an effect on the act itself, much like a circle that continually causes the effects of, and affects the causes of, its own existence.
From this recognition of the effects that motivations have on actions, one can conclude that the motivations which treat the beneficiaries as means and not as ends affect the actions in a way that inevitably reflects this. This is, then, a disrespecting of the beneficiaries who are not treated as beneficiaries for their own status as human beings (although a previous statement already precludes this possibility) but as beneficiaries for their status as ends towards accomplishing a goal. As already discussed, this definition of CS does not in any way negate certain purer motivations. Even if an actor performs the service with the best of all altruistic intentions, the very act of performing the service under the CS as defined earlier, with the recognition of certain explicit or implicit requirements set by other parties, causes this gulf and this treatment of the beneficiaries.
The aim of community service is to promote, to act on, to work towards the rights of the beneficiaries. Services that promote healthcare work on their rights to a good life, services that promote education work on their rights to education and opportunity, and so on. However, I see the act of CS to require a trespassing on the dignity of the beneficiaries. To provide for these rights, it is necessary, as shown previously, to subordinate the beneficiaries, which is an infringement of their dignity. Dignity and rights are mutually exclusive in the case of CS. One cannot promote the rights of the beneficiaries without trespassing on their dignity; one cannot respect their dignity without not acting on their rights. So, then, CS, which acts on their rights, has to infringe on their dignity, a necessary conclusion that can be drawn from the nature of CS as defined previously.
Towards an Ethical Form of Community Service
In the ``Preface", I stated that it is not my intention to launch an attack on community service and its ideals, rather, I wish to expose the limitations on the ethics of community service. Exposing the possible sources of unethical aspects of CS allows us to see where it is possible to promote these very ethics, to move towards an ethical form of community service.
A clearest route towards this ethical form is to offset these ethical problems with tangible benefits gained for the beneficiaries by the actors. The unethical aspects of CS as outlined are at their worst when the act of CS does nothing for the beneficiaries, for then such compromises with ethics and morality do not lead to any ends for the beneficiaries. That is, the beneficiaries are treated as ends when, and only when, the service is of benefit to them. If not, they are treated only as means towards accomplishing the requirements that predicate this form of service—-this treatment of the beneficiaries as means and not as ends is one of the worst of all ethical transgressions. The gulf that requires one party to view the other as objects is a necessity, but its obviously unethical nature can be overcome if the others are helped in some way; if the Other is helped, the objectification of this other is justified and does not need to be seen as completely unethical. In short, CS is only completely unethical if it is in itself an ends—-it can only be ethical if the unethical aspects of this act are means towards the obviously ethical ends of beneficence and helpfulness. Even as CS is distinct from these ethical forms of beneficence, it can be used as a means towards such forms, so that the inherent unethical nature of CS is justified and becomes a necessary tool towards an ethical treatment of the beneficiaries.
Conclusion
This paper, not meant to be ground-breaking in any way, is simply an explanation of my stance on community service and ethics. An exposition of this sort aims not to convert all readers to this point of view, but to open the possibility of drawing distinctions within such an issue that facilitates further investigations. With community service becoming such a social phenomenon in recent years, it is important to consider the ethics of such an act for the very reason that such consideration is a necessary step towards bettering community service initiatives. As all rational human beings strive to achieve within the moral and ethical laws, by exposing the reasoning behind the ethical importance of effectivecommunity service, it is my hope that community service efforts will become more self-aware and work towards such an ethical form, for the betterment of the beneficiaries and society.