SpaceCollective: Apollo

SpaceCollective: Apollo http://spacecollective.org/Apollo Mon, 18 Feb 2013 17:24:59 +0000 http://spacecollective.org/Apollo en Immanuel Kant on the investigation and use of reason in philosophy and the physical sciences http://spacecollective.org/Apollo/8279/Immanuel-Kant-on-the-investigation-and-use-of-reason-in-philosophy-and-the-physical-sciences http://spacecollective.org/Apollo/8279/Immanuel-Kant-on-the-investigation-and-use-of-reason-in-philosophy-and-the-physical-sciences Mon, 18 Feb 2013 17:24:59 +0000 Apollo 8279 <img src="http://spacecollective.org/userdata/tar5w4zB/1361237017/Immanuel Kant.jpg" border="0" width="" height="" align="left" class="padRight"> "Men began to investigate reason itself, long before starting methodically to investigate nature ·in the physical sciences·. Even at that stage, reason had already been employed in connection with ordinary experience; and reason is always present to us, whereas laws of nature have to be laboriously sought out. So metaphysics ﬂoated to the top like foam, which dissolved the moment it was scooped off. But as soon as one lot of foam dissolved, more came frothing up to the surface. Some philosophers eagerly collected foam; some tried to show their wisdom by ridiculing the vain efforts of others; none looked for the cause of the foam down in the depths." —Immanuel Kant, <a href="http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/pdfbits/kp1.pdf" target="_blank">Prolegomena on any Future Metaphysics</a>, p. 13 ("General Problems") http://spacecollective.org/Apollo/8279/Immanuel-Kant-on-the-investigation-and-use-of-reason-in-philosophy-and-the-physical-sciences The Influence of Malthus and Smith on Darwin’s 'On the Origin of Species' http://spacecollective.org/Apollo/8172/-The-Influence-of-Malthus-and-Smith-on-Darwins-On-the-Origin-of-Species http://spacecollective.org/Apollo/8172/-The-Influence-of-Malthus-and-Smith-on-Darwins-On-the-Origin-of-Species Thu, 27 Dec 2012 01:50:49 +0000 Apollo 8172 I wrote this paper for Dr. John Beatty's course at the University of British Columbia, Philosophy 469: 'Topics in Philosophy of Science - The Darwinian Revolution', in the Winter Session of 2012. It is licensed under a <a href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/deed.en_US" target="_blank">Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported License</a>. The Influence of Malthus and Smith on Darwin’s On the Origin of Species By Jason Fernando Upon reading Darwin’s On the Origin of Species, Karl Marx outlined his response to Darwin’s work in a letter to Friedrich Engels. “With Darwin,” Marx writes, “the animal kingdom figures as bourgeois society[1].” Marx found it “remarkable” the extent to which social ideas which were prominent in “[Darwin’s] English society” were present in Darwin’s view of nature[2]. Marx listed five such concepts which he felt were especially prominent in Darwin’s work: “…division of labour, competition, opening up of new markets, ‘inventions,’ and Malthusian ‘struggle for existence’”[3]. In this paper, I will explore Marx’s reading of Darwin by examining the extent to which these five concepts are indeed central to Darwin’s views. <img src="http://spacecollective.org/userdata/tar5w4zB/1356601781/Karl Marx 2.jpg" border="0" width="" height="" align="left" class="padRight"> <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Karl_Marx_001.jpg" target="_blank">Karl Marx</a>, c. 1875 Division of Labour In chapter four of the Origin, Darwin argues that “the more diversified the descendants from any one species become… by so much will they be better enabled to seize on many and widely diversified places in the polity of nature, and so be enabled to increase in numbers[4].” Darwin illustrates this point through the example of a “carnivorous quadruped”, whose species’ population size has already grown to the full extent which can be supported by its immediate territory[5]. Because of this, the only means by which this species could expand in numbers would be through “its varying descendants seizing on places at present occupied by other animals[6].” If, for instance, some members of this species were to feed on new kinds of pray, or develop new abilities such as the capacity to climb trees, then those members would have access to new food sources and thereby increase the probability of their own reproduction, relative to those other members of their species which had failed to diversify into new niches[7]. This view closely parallels the ideas of Adam Smith, as expressed in his famous book on economics, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (“The Wealth of Nations”, for short). Like Darwin, Smith advances the merits of the division of labour, albeit in the context of human society. Smith turns to “the trade of the pin-maker” (literally a manufacturer of pins) as a case study in the merits of a diversified workforce[8]. “A workman not educated to this business,” Smith argues, “nor acquainted with the use of the [relevant] machinery,” could never hope to compete with the productivity of a manufactory in which each stage of the pin-making process is undertaken by an individual worker, in conjunction with specialized machines[9]. A worker must either specialize his labour or risk being outcompeted by competitors[10]. In both Darwin and Smith’s examples, the individual organism/labourer is forced to become increasingly specialized in the face of stiff competition by its peers. This raises the question, where does this fierce competition stem from? <img src="http://spacecollective.org/userdata/tar5w4zB/1356601360/Thomas Malthus.jpg" border="0" width="" height="" align="right" class="padLeft"> <a href="http://www.nndb.com/people/250/000024178/" target="_blank">Thomas Malthus</a> Competition, Invention, and the Malthusian Struggle for Existence One of the foremost influences on Darwin’s Origin of Species is Thomas Malthus’ An Essay on the Principle of Population, as it Affects the Future Improvement of Society. In this paper, Malthus argues that “[it] is the constant tendency in all animated life to increase beyond the nourishment prepared for it[11].” Because of this tendency, species are consistently faced with resource scarcities which act as a check against their instinctive drive toward reproduction[12]. While Malthus believes that this rule applies universally throughout nature, his essay focuses on its influence on human societies[13]. In particular, Malthus is interested in the effects which this ‘struggle for existence’ has had on the development of moral virtues: while humans are driven by instinct “to the increase of [their] species”, this drive to reproduction is also tempered by “reason”[14]. It is this “reason”, Malthus argues, that causes individuals to engage in voluntary moral behaviours, such as the decision to refrain from having children when one does not have the means to support them[15]. In this manner, Malthus believes that the perpetual scarcity of resources serves a progressive function by forcing humans to develop morally as a means to survive economically. Here, the similarities with Darwin are striking. For, just as Malthus believes that the scarcity of resources is responsible for the moral development of humans, Darwin argues that the ‘struggle for existence’ is responsible for the emergence of new and favourable adaptations within species[16]. As Darwin writes in his introduction to the Origin: natural selection consists of “…the doctrine of Malthus applied with manifold force to the whole animal and vegetable kingdoms”[17]. Despite this apparent similarity with Malthus’ ideas, it would be overly simplistic to view Darwin’s theory as one of an inevitable positive progression through a series of incrementally superior adaptations. Natural selection is not progressive in that sense, for it readily acknowledges that the objective of adaptation is simply the survival of the organism in question[18]. Darwin provides examples of organisms whose physiology has remained almost unchanged throughout vast expanses of time, noting that such “living fossils” tend to be more common among relatively simplistic organisms[19]. These examples run contrary to a Malthusian view of progress, for they suggest that the progression toward increasingly complex adaptations occurs if and only if such adaptations are beneficial in supporting a species’ survival and reproduction. Through a Darwinian lens, the progression toward complexity in nature seems more a by-product of the struggle for survival than an end in itself. However, Darwin does exhibit a great degree of admiration—one might fairly say a ‘preference’—for the more advanced species of animals. In the closing paragraph of the Origin, he describes “the production of the higher animals” as “the most exalted object which we are capable of conceiving”[20]. This statement strongly suggests that Darwin views more complex and sophisticated species as not only pragmatically superior to other organisms—better suited for survival, for instance—but also as intrinsically superior[21]. In this view, progression in evolutionary terms takes on a qualitative dimension similar to Malthus’ views on the effects of resource scarcity on the moral development of humankind. New Markets In chapter three of the Origin, Darwin describes the way in which the respective populations of species are prevented from expanding indefinitely through a complicated network of interactions with other species[22]. On first reading, these interactions seem essentially competitive in nature—and, for the most part, they are—but Darwin raises exceptional instances in which organisms have come to support one another’s mutual survival, purely through the pursuit of their own self-interest[23]. To illustrate this, Darwin provides examples of English plants which rely almost entirely on various insects for their fertilization[24]. The insects, in their part, frequent the plants for their own benefit[25]. Bees, for example, visit English clover plants in order to feed on their nectar[26]. In doing so, they inadvertently collect the plant’s pollen onto their bodies, and transfer it to other clover plants, thus aiding in the clovers’ reproduction[27]. <img src="http://spacecollective.org/userdata/tar5w4zB/1356601341/Adam Smith.jpg" border="0" width="" height="" align="left" class="padRight"> <a href="https://wiki.uchicago.edu/display/powerpedia/Adam+Smith" target="_blank">Adam Smith</a> Such complex interactions of species are reminiscent of the second chapter of Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations. In this chapter (titled “Origin of Division of Labour”), Smith argues that “[an individual] will be more likely to prevail if he can interest [the] self-love” of his fellow citizens[28]. This view must be read in the context of Smith’s belief that, given the division of labour which is characteristic of “civilized society,” every individual “stands at all times in need of the co-operation and assistance of great multitudes[29].” For example, a baker might be self-sufficient with respect to bread, but she will nevertheless be dependent on other specialized labourers for access to a host of other commodities and services—clothing, housing, medical treatment, and other foodstuffs being but a few examples. It is therefore necessary for her to offer others something in exchange for their labour, whether through a direct barter transaction or one facilitated by the use of a currency[30]. As Smith points out, a similar dynamic applies to all other members of a diversified labour force, and it is for this reason that appealing to the self-interest of others is of paramount importance[31]. As Smith puts it, “It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest[32].” In reading Darwin’s On the Origin of Species from the perspective of Marx, I am struck by the extent to which the economic ideas of Darwin’s time, while clearly visible in his text, were not evident to me upon my first reading of the Origin. It is as though these underlying ideas, embedded into Darwin’s account of evolution, passed undetected by my critical eye. Yet history has taught us that there is danger in the unquestioning acceptance of ideas—especially those which are dominant in one’s culture and one’s time. Marx’s reading of Darwin reminds us that Darwin’s ideas are not separate from the particular historical and cultural tradition of which he is part. Furthermore, it leaves us with what I believe is a worthwhile lesson: that we should always remain open to the evaluation and re-evaluation of our ideas, no matter how powerful, entrenched, or beloved they have become. To do so, after all, is of the highest standard of science. [1] Karl Marx to Friedrich Engels, June 18, 1862. [2] Ibid. [3] Ibid. [4] Charles Darwin, On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection, or the Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life (London: John Murray, 1859), 112. [5] Ibid. [6] Ibid. [7] Ibid. [8] Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (London, 1776), 8. [9] Ibid. [10] Ibid., 9. [11] Thomas Malthus, An Essay on the Principle of Population, as it Affects the Future Improvement of Society (London: John Murray, 1798), 2. [12] Ibid., 17-25. [13] Ibid., 1. [14] Ibid. [15] Ibid., 3. [16] Darwin, On the Origin of Species (London: John Murray, 1859), 80-81. [17] Ibid., 5. [18] Ibid., 485-488. [19] Ibid., 107. [20] Ibid., 490. [21] Ibid. [22] Ibid., 60-79. [23] Ibid., 71-75. [24] Ibid., 73-74. [25] Ibid. [26] Ibid., 74. [27] Ibid. [28] Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations (London, 1776), 18. [29] Ibid. [30] Ibid. [31] Ibid. [32] Ibid. http://spacecollective.org/Apollo/8172/-The-Influence-of-Malthus-and-Smith-on-Darwins-On-the-Origin-of-Species In Defense of William Paley: Reasoning by Analogy in the History of Science http://spacecollective.org/Apollo/8085/In-Defense-of-William-Paley-Reasoning-by-Analogy-in-the-History-of-Science http://spacecollective.org/Apollo/8085/In-Defense-of-William-Paley-Reasoning-by-Analogy-in-the-History-of-Science Fri, 30 Nov 2012 09:26:30 +0000 Apollo 8085 I wrote this paper for Dr. John Beatty's course at the University of British Columbia, Philosophy 469: 'Topics in Philosophy of Science - The Darwinian Revolution', in the Winter Session of 2012. It is is licensed under a <a href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/deed.en_US" target="_blank">Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported License</a>. <a href="http://ncse.com/rncse/29/4/william-paley-1743-1805" target="_blank"><img src="http://spacecollective.org/userdata/tar5w4zB/1354296086/William Paley Excerpt from Natural Theology.jpg" border="0" width="" height="" class="padTopBot"></a> <cap>Excerpt from William Paley's Natural Theology, image from the National Center for Science Education</cap> William Paley, a utilitarian moral philosopher and Christian apologist of the mid-18th century, was a seminal thinker of his time[1]. Paley’s Natural Theology, published in 1802 just three years before his death, encapsulates Paley’s religious views and illustrates his style of argumentation. In Natural Theology¸ Paley puts forward a teleological argument in support of his belief that the natural world is the product of intelligent design. To do so, he engages in a process of reasoning by analogy by which he draws generalized conclusions based on well-understood phenomena. While Paley’s ideas are often criticized as ‘unscientific’ by modern readers, I will defend Paley’s Natural Theology by showing how its style of argumentation is in fact consistent with the scientific standards of Paley’s time. In doing so, I will focus on two documents in addition to Paley’s Natural Theology: John Herschel’s Preliminary Discourse on the Study of Natural Philosophy, and William Whewell’s The Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, Founded Upon Their History. In Natural Theology, Paley writes: “I know of no better method of introducing so large a subject [as the origin and development of life], than that of comparing a single thing with a single ting; an eye, for example, with a telescope. As far as the examination of the instrument goes, there is precisely the same proof that the eye was made for vision, as there is that the telescope was made for assisting it.”[2] <a href="http://p-adamek0912-dc.blogspot.ca/2010/10/arguments-for-gods-existence-design.html" target="_blank"><img src="http://spacecollective.org/userdata/tar5w4zB/1354294251/William Paley.jpg" border="0" width="" height="" align="left" class="padRight"></a> <cap>William Paley</cap> This passage is emblematic of Paley’s approach to argument. Given that the subject in question—the creation of organic matter, in this case the human eye—cannot be empirically observed, Paley focuses on an analogous structure—the telescope—in the hopes that scrutiny of the latter will yield insight into the former. Paley’s argument proceeds as follows: 1) He identifies his primary object of inquiry (the human eye) and its analogue (the telescope).[3] 2) He describes the structural similarities between the human eye and the telescope through a series of lengthy and detailed comparisons, thereby asserting the validity of his chosen analogy.[4] 3) He infers that, given their structural similarities, both structures are likely to have been produced by a similar cause. Based on this inference, Paley concludes that the known cause of the telescope (an intelligent designer) should apply to its analogue, the human eye. The eye is thus the product of an intelligent creator.[5] While one might disagree with Paley’s premises and conclusions, it would be wrong to dismiss the underlying structure of his argument as ‘unscientific’. In fact, Paley’s method of reasoning through analogy is consistent with the scientific standards of his time. <a href="http://www.daviddarling.info/encyclopedia/H/HerschelJ.html" target="_blank"><img src="http://spacecollective.org/userdata/tar5w4zB/1354294357/John Herschel.jpg" border="0" width="" height="" align="right" class="padLeft"></a> <cap>John Herschel</cap> To illustrate this, I will now turn to John Herschel’s 1831 publication, Preliminary Discourse on the Study of Natural Philosophy. In it, Herschel—an eminent astronomer of his time—stresses “the great importance” of using “analogous instances or phenomena” in the process of scientific reasoning[6]. “Whenever… any phenomenon presents itself for explanation,” Hershel writes, “we naturally seek, in the first instance, to refer it to some one or other of those real causes which experience has shown to exist, and to be efficacious in producing similar phenomena.”[7]. Paley employs this technique in the first and final stages of his argument, in which he attributes the known cause of the telescope—intelligent design—to the human eye. Hershel elaborates on this principle by stating that, in reasoning by analogy, “[one’s] probability of success will… depend… [on] the closeness of [one’s] analogy with that in question”[8]. Similarly, Paley establishes the “closeness” of his analogy through the second stage of his argument[9]. Paley’s reasoning is also consistent with recommendations made by William Whewell in The Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, Founded Upon Their History. In this text, Whewell outlines the four “Rules of Philosophising” which Isaac Newton “inserted in the second edition of the Principia”[10]. Of these four rules, the first, second and fourth rules are of interest to us in evaluating the quality of Paley’s reasoning. <a href="http://www-history.mcs.st-and.ac.uk/Posters/306b.html" target="_blank"><img src="http://spacecollective.org/userdata/tar5w4zB/1354295766/William Whewell_2.jpeg" border="0" width="" height="" align="left" class="padRight"></a> <cap>William Whewell</cap> Newton’s first “Rule of Philosophising” states that one should not “…admit other causes of natural things such as both are true, and suffice for explaining their phenomena.”[11] Whether or not Paley meets this criteria will depend on the reader’s perspective. From Paley’s standpoint as a religious believer, the proposition that God exists and is responsible for the divine creation of life on Earth is both “true” and “[sufficient] for explaining… phenomena.”[12] Yet a modern reader is likely to have different standards, and might reject such invocations of God. Here again, my intention is to evaluate the validity of Paley’s argument given the scientific standards of his time. If we read Paley from a historically adjusted perspective—that is, if we imagine reading his argument from the standpoint of his contemporaries—I believe that he would surely honour Newton’s first rule. Newton’s second rule states that “Natural effects of the same kind are to be referred to the same causes, as far as can be done.”[13] This rule closely echoes Herschel’s recommendations, and Paley meets this rule in the same manner as was described previously. The fourth “Rule of Philosophizing” states that “…propositions collected from phenomena by induction, are to be held as true either accurately or approximately… till other phenomena occur by which they may be rendered either more accurate or liable to exception.”[14] This rule is perhaps the most interesting of the three, in terms of how it relates to Natural Theology. At the time of Paley’s writing, the creationist view which he defends was the dominant explanation for the origin of life. Darwin’s theory of evolution by natural selection, whose modern iterations have since all but replaced creationism in scientific thinking, was only published in 1859—more than half a century after Paley’s death. Given the knowledge which was available to Paley at the time of writing, it was reasonable for him to hold his creationist views as “true either accurately or approximately”, as an alternative theory had not yet “[occurred] by which they may be rendered either more accurate or liable to exception.”[15] From Paley’s standpoint, the existence of an intelligent creator would have been the simplest and most logical explanation for the origins of the human eye. Through this paper, I have endeavoured to show that the style of argument made by Paley in Natural Theology is consistent with the scientific standards of his age, as represented by the works of John Herschel and William Whewell. Furthermore, I have expressed some of the objections to Paley’s argument which are likely to be raised by modern readers, and have defended Paley against these objections based on the belief that his arguments should be evaluated in light of their historical context. However, one aspect of my position needs to be clarified. The basic structure of Paley’s argument continues to emerge in modern debates between evolutionists (here, I am referring to an understanding of evolutionary theory by which an intelligent designer is not required to spur the development of life) and proponents of intelligent design. It is my opinion that, while Paley’s line of reasoning can be considered ‘scientific’ within its historical context, the same cannot be said with the respect to similar arguments being voiced in the modern day. The standards of scientific reasoning have shifted markedly since the time of Paley’s writing, and key elements of Paley’s reasoning—such as his invocation of God, an unfalsifiable proposition—are not scientific by modern standards. What Paley does provide is an excellent case study of scientific reasoning as was common in mid-18th century Britain. While Paley’s reliance on untestable premises is unscientific by modern standards, his use of analogous reasoning remains an integral tool of science, both historically and in the present day. [1] “William Paley,” NNDB, accessed October 16th, 2012,<a href="http://www.nndb.com/people/526/000096238/" target="blank">http://www.nndb.com/people/526/000096238/</a> [2] William Paley, Natural Theology or, Evidences of the Existence and Attributes of the Deity, Collected from the Appearances of Nature (London: Fauldner, 1809), 18. [3] Ibid. [4] Ibid., 18-27. [5] Ibid., 29. [6] John Herschel, Preliminary Discourse on the Study of Natural Philosophy (London: 1830), 149. [7] Ibid., 148. [8] Ibid. [9] Paley, Natural Theology, 18-27. [10] William Whewell, The Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, Founded Upon Their History (London: John W. Parker, 1837), 440. [11] Ibid. [12] Ibid. [13] Ibid. [14] Ibid. [15] Ibid. http://spacecollective.org/Apollo/8085/In-Defense-of-William-Paley-Reasoning-by-Analogy-in-the-History-of-Science The Impact of the Second World War on Physics, Culture, and the Scientific Enterprise http://spacecollective.org/Apollo/8049/The-Impact-of-the-Second-World-War-on-Physics-Culture-and-the-Scientific-Enterprise http://spacecollective.org/Apollo/8049/The-Impact-of-the-Second-World-War-on-Physics-Culture-and-the-Scientific-Enterprise Sat, 17 Nov 2012 23:23:34 +0000 Apollo 8049 I wrote this paper for Dr. Robert Brain's course at the University of British Columbia, History/Philosophy 260: 'Science and Society in the Contemporary World', in the Winter Session of 2012. <img src="http://spacecollective.org/userdata/tar5w4zB/1353222873/Werner Heisenberg.jpg" border="0" width="" height="" align="left" class="padRight"> Werner Heisenberg [source: <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Werner_Heisenberg" target="_blank">Wikipedia</a>] Michael Frayn’s play Copenhagen describes the world of pre-WWII physics as an intellectual ‘golden age’. In it, the physicists Niels Bohr and Werner Heisenberg reminisce nostalgically about the way physics operated before the Second World War, lamenting the loss of a world in which fellow physicists could freely travel, collaborate, and share ideas[1]. In this essay, I will outline the way in which the Second World War overturned this decentralized model of physics and replaced it with a highly centralized alternative. Finally, I will explore the impact of this shift on science and culture in the modern world. <img src="http://spacecollective.org/userdata/tar5w4zB/1353223032/Niels Bohr.jpg" border="0" width="" height="" align="right" class="padLeft"> Neils Bohr [source: <a href="http://www.tumblr.com/tagged/de-broglie" target="_blank">Tumblr</a>] The golden age of physics which the characters of Bohr and Heisenberg allude to was a real historical phenomenon. In the years prior to the onset of Nazism in Germany and the ensuing World War, physics was indeed a flourishing discipline throughout Europe, and in Germany in particular[2]. During this time, physicists like Bohr, Heisenberg, and their contemporaries made up a close-knit community of scientists. Spread throughout Europe in various academic institutions, these scientists held regular correspondence, visited one another at their respective universities, and openly shared ideas and collaborated on basic research—all with relative autonomy from social and political considerations[3]. The End of an Era Two major factors converged to cause an end to this way of doing physics. First, throughout the early 1930s the tide of persecution against Jews which accompanied the rise of the Nazi Party caused many of Germany’s top theoretical physicists to immigrate to the United States[4]. Second, the discovery of nuclear fission by Enrico Fermi in 1934 and the subsequent ratification of this finding by the physicists Otto Hahn and Fritz Strassman, provided the theoretical foundation for the development of atomic weapons[5]. Eager to secure a military advantage over Germany and fearing the prospect of a German nuclear bomb, the United States under President Roosevelt funded a massive industrial project—known today as ‘The Manhattan Project’—with the express goal of creating an atomic bomb for themselves[6]. The Manhattan Project: A New Paradigm The Manhattan Project was managed by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, under the personal direction of General Leslie R. Groves[7]. Groves’ first major decision was to appoint J. Robert Oppenheimer—then a professor of theoretical physics at University of California, Berkeley—as managing director of the project’s scientists[8]. Under Groves, the Manhattan Project functioned through a strict hierarchy of command: at the top were the managers, people like Groves and Oppenheimer whose job it was to manage the overarching direction of the project. Beneath them were the scientists; and beneath them, the engineers. Each layer of the hierarchy supported the layer above it: the engineers implemented the theoretical discoveries of the scientists, which in turn influenced the decisions of the managers[9]. <img src="http://spacecollective.org/userdata/tar5w4zB/1353223049/Oppie_Grover.jpg" border="0" width="" height="" align="left" class="padRight"> Groves (right) and Oppenheimer [source: <a href="http://www.lanl.gov/orgs/pa/newsbulletin/2004/04/22/text02.shtml" target="_blank">Los Alamos National Laboratory</a>] This new system of organization was a dramatic break from tradition in physics. The project’s physicists (many of them expatriate Europeans), accustomed to the decentralized customs of earlier times, now found themselves at the center of a vast military-industrial bureaucracy. Leó Szilárd, one of the project’s most eminent theoretical physicists, loathed the industrial structure of the operation and attempted to rally support from fellow scientists in favour of a more “democratic” approach[10]. While Szilárd won sympathy from many of his colleagues, the political momentum behind the Manhattan Project proved insurmountable, and the project went ahead as planned[11]. The rest, as they say, is history. Impact on Science and Culture It can said that, long after the mushroom clouds had faded from the skies of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the world as a whole continues to live in the shadow of atomic power. Today, we continue to wrestle over fears of nuclear proliferation and the safety of civilian nuclear power. Yet I believe that the same can be said with respect to the Manhattan Project’s industrial approach to science. Since the end of the Second World War, we have seen this approach re-emerge in a host of subsequent projects. We see it, for instance, in the existence of a permanent national infrastructure for the production of weapons and military hardware—that vast network of scientists, contractors, engineers, and government agencies which President Dwight Eisenhower famously referred to as “the military-industrial complex”[12]. <img src="http://spacecollective.org/userdata/tar5w4zB/1353223067/Alvin M. Weinberg.jpg" border="0" width="" height="" align="left" class="padRight"> Alvin M. Weinberg [source: <a href="http://www.the-weinberg-foundation.org/" target="_blank">The Weinberg Foundation</a>] This new model of science is not without its critics[13]. In his 1961 paper titled Impact of Large-Scale Science on the United States, Alvin M. Weinberg—then the administrator of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, an important Manhattan Project research facility—argues that the model of “Big Science” (a term used to describe large-scale industrial science projects) places undue importance on large industrial “monuments”, and risks diverting scientists’ attention from their “real purpose,” that is, “the enriching and broadening of human life”[14]. There is no doubt that something has been lost in the transition to Big Science. Gone are the days of the individual scientific giants—the Galileos, or Newtons, or Darwins developing revolutionary ideas in small, private laboratories. Their image seems increasingly eclipsed by the machinery of science— the atom bomb, the space shuttle, the Large Hadron Collider—which have come to symbolize science in contemporary culture. But it is equally true that something has been gained. Big Science has produced wonders, such as the Human Genome Project, and the International Space Station, which would have been unattainable—perhaps even unimaginable—to previous generations of scientists. In these and other projects, we see the profound influence which Big Science has had in defining the modern world. Still, the question of whether these changes are a blessing or a curse will depend on one’s individual perspective. For myself, I feel that the positive ramifications of the shift to Big Science outweigh its negative effects. Science itself is an engine which may be applied toward constructive or destructive ends. Because of this, the onus is on us to determine where we wish to direct the creative power of science. If we envision larger and more deadly weapons, then that is the direction in which we are likely to move. If, however, we imagine a future in which the engine of science is directed toward the enrichment of life and the circumvention of common challenges, then I believe that it is well within our power to sow the seeds of a new golden age. Works Cited Brain, Robert. “The Physicist’s Century.” Lecture at the University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC, September 11th, 2012. Brain, Robert. “Cold War Counterculture.” Lecture at the University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC, October 4th, 2012. Frayn, Michael. Copenhagen. New York: Anchor Books, 1998. Halsall, Paul. “Modern History Sourcebook: President Dwight Eisenhower: Farewell to the Nation, January 17, 1961.” Internet Modern History Sourcebook. July 1998.<a href="http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1961eisenhower-farewell.html." target="blank">http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1961eisenhower-farewell.html.</a> Hughes, Thomas P. “Tennessee Valley and Manhattan Engineer District.” American Genesis: A Century of Invention and Technological Enthusiasm, 1870-1970. New York, London, Toronto: Penguin, 1989. Walker, J. Samuel. Prompt and Utter Destruction: Truman and the Use of Atomic Bombs Against Japan. Chapel Hill and London: The University of North Carolina Press, 2004. Weinberg, Alvin M. “Impact of Large-Scale Science on the United States.” Science 134, no. 3473 (1961): 161-164. [1] Michael Frayn, Copenhagen (New York: Anchor Books, 1998), 60-61. [2] Robert Brain, “The Physicist’s Century” (lecture, the University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC, September 11th, 2012). [3] Ibid. [4] Ibid. [5] Frayn, Copenhagen, 12. [6] J. Samuel Walker, Prompt and Utter Destruction: Truman and the Use of Atomic Bombs Against Japan (Chapel Hill and London: The University of North Carolina Press, 2004), 10. [7] Ibid. [8] Ibid., 11. [9] Ibid. [10] Thomas P. Hughes, “Tennessee Valley and Manhattan Engineer District,” American Genesis: A Century of Invention and Technological Enthusiasm, 1870-1970 (New York, London, Toronto: Penguin, 1989), 353-442. [11] Ibid. [12] Halsall, Paul. “Modern History Sourcebook: President Dwight Eisenhower: Farewell to the Nation, January 17, 1961,” Internet Modern History Sourcebook, July 1998,<a href="http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1961eisenhower-farewell.html." target="blank">http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1961eisenhower-farewell.html.</a> [13] Robert Brain, “Cold War Counterculture” (lecture, the University of British Columbia, October 4th, 2012). [14] Alvin M. Weinberg, “Impact of Large-Scale Science on the United States,” Science 134, no. 3473 (1961): 161-164. <a href="http://wwww.jstor.org/stable/1708292." target="blank">http://wwww.jstor.org/stable/1708292.</a>  http://spacecollective.org/Apollo/8049/The-Impact-of-the-Second-World-War-on-Physics-Culture-and-the-Scientific-Enterprise "Time, unimaginable time, that was the key..." http://spacecollective.org/Apollo/7911/Time-unimaginable-time-that-was-the-key- http://spacecollective.org/Apollo/7911/Time-unimaginable-time-that-was-the-key- Sat, 22 Sep 2012 20:01:46 +0000 Apollo 7911 <a href="http://pubs.usgs.gov/gip/2008/58/" target="_blank"><div align="center"><img src="http://spacecollective.org/userdata/tar5w4zB/1348369233/geotimespiraln.jpg" width="" height="" border="0" /></div></a> "Lyell was right: [mountains] grow barely perceptively, the product of thousands of tiny rises... over the aeons. Time, unimaginable time, that was the key; given it, anything could be achieved. Darwin now understood. He plotted the quake's epicenter and pinned down its cause to incipient volcanic action. Hot springs and 'bubbles of gas & discoloured water' percolating into the sea proved beyond doubt that 'the earth is a mere crust over a fluid melted mass of rock.' Earthquakes and volcanoes had revealed Nature's awesome power, its driving force. But where did man — puny man — fit into her picture? It was 'bitter & humiliating' to contemplate his vulnerability, 'skating over very thin ice,' a crustal sheet, above a fiery furnace. Yet accept it he must." —Adrian Desmond & James Moore, Darwin: The Life of a Tormented Evolutionist. P. 162. Emphasis added. http://spacecollective.org/Apollo/7911/Time-unimaginable-time-that-was-the-key- Harnessing Consumerism: A NASA / Starbucks Collaboration http://spacecollective.org/Apollo/7864/Harnessing-Consumerism-A-NASA-Starbucks-Collaboration http://spacecollective.org/Apollo/7864/Harnessing-Consumerism-A-NASA-Starbucks-Collaboration Sun, 02 Sep 2012 15:59:55 +0000 Apollo 7864 <a href="http://www.penny4nasa.org/" target="_blank"><img src="http://spacecollective.org/userdata/tar5w4zB/1346626660/head.png" border="0" width="" height="" class="padTopBot"> <cap>I am not affiliated with Penny4NASA.org. I do, however, support their efforts!</cap></a> This morning, my father made a remark which stuck with me. He raised the question of what would happen if—instead of compulsively buying random consumer products at the last minute—customers of major brands like Starbucks had the option of donating spare change (however little, however much) to help fund NASA. I imagined little box at the Starbucks counter titled 'Tips For NASA', or something along those lines. I couldn't help thinking that the idea is actually less silly than it might sound at first: after all, Starbucks does pride itself on pursuing innovative social and environmental initiatives, and it also actively solicits ideas and suggestions from its consumer-base. Given the tremendous role which NASA plays in providing new technologies and opportunities in the American economy, it seemed reasonable enough that Starbucks might be interested in doing something to support the agency. I posted the idea on the Starbucks site listed above, and the text is copied below :) Help Fund NASA Through In-Store Donations My idea is simple: support the American space program by including a ‘Tips for NASA’ at Starbucks locations in which people can place donations to support the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Why Starbucks? Starbucks has demonstrated a history of corporate responsibility through its willingness to fund innovative projects that support environmental and social causes. Initiatives such as the Ethos® Water Fund, the Thrive Wellness program, and their partnership with Conservation International speak to Starbucks’ commitment to responsible business practices. Many of these initiatives have been aimed toward supporting local environments and economies in coffee-producing regions; a new initiative aimed at promoting the space program of the US would provide an ideal avenue through which Starbucks can give back to its home country in a highly meaningful way. Why NASA? Since its founding in 1958, NASA has been at the forefront of technological development and scientific research. Since that time, it has achieved unparalleled milestones of innovation and achievement, spawning a wide portfolio of transformative technologies which have contributed both to our industries and to our daily lives. Through its direct missions and its numerous partnerships with governmental and commercial organizations, NASA has proven itself to be a cornerstone of American capability and achievement in the modern world. As a corporate leader with a strong history of socially responsible business practices, Starbucks is an ideal company to support NASA in its quest to realize the future. By supporting NASA, Starbucks would be contributing not only to the future of American science and technology, but also to the quality of its domestic economy. Through its vast network of contractors and partner companies, NASA supports a large number of high-quality US jobs which are resistant to the pressures of outsourcing. The ‘Space Economy’ which is spearheaded by NASA represents a viable and compelling model for the future of the American economy; by creating high-quality skilled jobs for American workers, NASA encourages the next generation of passionate Americans to fully utilize their skills and imaginations for the benefit of the nation and of all humankind. There is no limit to what the United States can continue to achieve if it makes real economic growth through innovation a priority—and NASA is the ideal organization through which to support this goal. Every dollar for NASA is spent toward the future of the United States. In Summary A simple initiative of providing a ‘Tip Jar for NASA’ at Starbucks stores would provide a meaningful source of funding for this great organization, and—at virtually no cost whatsoever—would further cement Starbucks’ reputation as a responsible and innovative corporate citizen. Learn More - Neil DeGrasse Tyson - We Stopped Dreaming - Episode 1:<a href="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CbIZU8cQWXc" target="blank">http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CbIZU8cQWXc</a> - Episode 2:<a href="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BFO2usVjfQc" target="blank">http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BFO2usVjfQc</a> - Penny For NASA Campaign:<a href="http://www.penny4nasa.org/" target="blank">http://www.penny4nasa.org/</a> - NASA Technologies in Daily Life:<a href="http://spinoff.nasa.gov/Spinoff2008/tech_benefits.html" target="blank">http://spinoff.nasa.gov/Spinoff2008/tech_benefits.html</a> - NASA’s Role in the US Economy:<a href="http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/609548main_Space%20Enterprise%20Council%20Briefing%20Final%20Package%20Dec%209%20updated.pdf" target="blank">http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/609548main_Space%20Enterprise%20Council%20Briefing%20Final%20Package%20Dec%209%20updated.pdf</a> - NASA’s Positive Impact on Society: <a href="http://www.nasa.gov/50th/50th_magazine/benefits.html" target="blank">http://www.nasa.gov/50th/50th_magazine/benefits.html</a>  http://spacecollective.org/Apollo/7864/Harnessing-Consumerism-A-NASA-Starbucks-Collaboration The Role of the Scientific Revolution in Catalyzing Social and Political Change (Grade 12 essay for AP History) http://spacecollective.org/Apollo/7844/The-Role-of-the-Scientific-Revolution-in-Catalyzing-Social-and-Political-Change-Grade-12-essay-for-AP-History- http://spacecollective.org/Apollo/7844/The-Role-of-the-Scientific-Revolution-in-Catalyzing-Social-and-Political-Change-Grade-12-essay-for-AP-History- Sun, 26 Aug 2012 16:39:18 +0000 Apollo 7844 (I would like to give thanks to my instructor, Ludovit Paskovic, whose in-class lectures proved invaluable in the writing of this paper. He often encouraged us to write our papers in a spontaneous manner and without the use of reference materials; there are therefore no works cited at the end of this paper, as none were used aside from Ludovit Paskovic's lectures.) Explain how specific ideas and methods of reasoning led directly to new political and social ideas. <div align="center"><img src="http://spacecollective.org/userdata/tar5w4zB/1346023694/newton-exp.jpg" width="" height="" border="0" /></div> Image source: <a href="http://www.astrosurf.com/luxorion/Images/newton-exp.jpg" target="_blank">http://www.astrosurf.com/luxorion/newton-hommage5.htm</a> The Scientific Revolution spawned a wave of revolutionary new ideas and methodologies which would come to profoundly influence the course of Western Civilization. While the Scientific Revolution featured a wide variety of innovative ideas, they were linked together by the central concept of rationalism. No one individual can claim more credit for the development of rationalism as a cohesive paradigm of thought than René Descartes, whose contributions catalyzed the Scientific Revolution’s universal belief in the power of reason as an intrinsic human faculty. In doing so, Descartes was supported by the work of Francis Bacon, who promoted induction as a means of arriving at rational conclusions. This belief in the power of human rationality was made all the more powerful by the ground-breaking work of Isaac Newton, who—through his work in uncovering the secrets of gravity and other natural phenomena—affirmed in an irretraceable manner humanity’s faith in natural law. Furthermore, Newton’s discoveries implied the existence of an underlying order to the complexities of the natural world. In time, Newton’s contributions gave rise to the perspective on nature known as the Newtonian world-machine: the belief that nature functions as a vast mechanism whose workings could be understood through inductive reasoning and rationality. Despite their tremendous long-term implications, the contributions of Descartes and Newton were initially confined to the realm of the sciences. This changed in time, however, as the principles established in the Scientific Revolution found a growing number of applications in political and social matters. John Locke was most responsible for this change; through his work, he catalyzed the application of rationality and other scientific principles in dealing with social and political problems, much in the same way that a mathematician would employ rationality in the resolution of an equation. Examples of this influence can be seen in subsequent developments, such as in the rise of liberal economics as initially defined by Adam Smith, as well as in the attempted legal reforms of Cesare Beccaria. The Scientific Revolution brought with it a host of innovative and paradigm-shifting ideas, as well as entirely new methods of inquiry. While initially the application of these new ideas and methods was restricted largely to the sciences, their influence eventually spread to political and social matters, unleashing a culture of experimentation and reform which continues to this day. <img src="http://spacecollective.org/userdata/tar5w4zB/1346023774/descartes-billet01.jpg" border="0" width="" height="" class="padTopBot"> Image source: <a href="http://www.bookine.net/descartes-bio.htm" target="_blank">http://www.bookine.net/descartes-bio.htm</a> Descartes argued against the system of empiricism, an approach to thought which holds that sensory experiences represent the most reliable source from which to derive knowledge. In its stead, Descartes asserted the existence of a priori knowledge; that is, knowledge which can be accessed innately, inside oneself, without the need for corroboration by external phenomena. An important element of this philosophy was the belief that such knowledge was reliable only because it stems naturally from one’s rational nature. Thus, the concept of a priori knowledge carries with it the implication that human beings have an innate sense of rationality, which—if developed—can serve as a highly-reliable source of knowledge. Descartes’ trust in the potential for innate knowledge led him to construct an entirely new philosophy from the simple phrase, cogito ergo sum (“I think, therefore I am.”) Descartes’ method of attempting to arrive at truth through the use of a priori knowledge is consistent with Francis Bacon’s method of eliminative induction. Bacon’s method stressed the importance of rigorous experimentation; he believed that conclusions should be developed only as a result of extensive evidence and experimentation. In this way, he challenged the prevailing system of deductive reasoning, by which particular conclusions are arrived at based on general (and often “empirical”, or sensory) observations. Thus, both Descartes and Bacon offered new methods of inquiry which sought to replace the culture of empiricism which was dominant at the time. Despite this shared objective, their methods differed greatly, and Descartes’ contributions to philosophy would eventually come to eclipse those of Bacon. The profound historical significance of Descartes’ philosophy of knowledge lies in the role it played in helping to develop the school of thought known as rationalism, a concept which would come to fundamentally change Western attitudes towards the process of thought itself. Descartes articulated the virtues of rationality as a distinct human faculty, separate from religious faith or any form of superstition. It was, in effect, the birth of a new intellectual paradigm, one founded on rationality rather than on faith. The creation of this new paradigm empowered the growing number of rationalists in Europe by providing them with the framework for a common philosophy, a set of unspoken beliefs centered on the importance and potential of reason. In doing so, Descartes transformed “rationality”—which had existed in recognizable form within Western Civilization since at least the time of the Greeks—to “rationalism”, a unique and confident assertion of the value of human reason. <blockquote> "If a man will begin with certainties, he shall end in doubts; but if he will be content to begin with doubts, he shall end in certainties." —Francis Bacon (1605) The Advancement of Learning, Book 1, v, 8 [web source: <a href="http://goo.gl/i6ab0" target="_blank">http://goo.gl/i6ab0</a>]</blockquote> The belief in human reason which was encouraged and exemplified in the work of Descartes was put into even greater application by Isaac Newton. Through his ground-breaking work in mathematics and physics, Newton pioneered the belief that the world and everything in it exists in accordance with natural laws, and that through understanding of these laws one can understand any aspect of the natural world. This was the guiding premise of the Newtonian world-machine: the belief that nature, and everything in it, could be understood through the careful application of rationality and inquiry. For Newton, solving even nature’s most complex mechanisms could be achieved by uncovering its component parts and guiding principles. This concept of the world as a sort of vast mechanism open to human inquiry revolutionized humanity’s approach to unraveling scientific problems. What had previously been a baffling mystery unfit for human contemplation had become an intricate puzzle, a sort of universal equation which—though admittedly complex—could be understood provided the uncovering of its relevant variables. Effectively, the belief system ushered in by Newton’s work asserted that the mysteries of nature can be uncovered through induction and analysis—that rationality, like mathematics, is the gate and key to understanding. Newton put into practice the principled reliance on reason which was previously established by Descartes. In doing so, he embodied a paradigm of scientific inquiry which would become the template and ideal of subsequent generations of rationalists. While Newton’s contributions did much to unleash the potential and imagination of Europe’s burgeoning scientific community, they also indirectly resulted in the gradual transition towards the use of rationality and other scientific methods in the realm of social and political experimentation. In essence, through opening up the world of nature to human scrutiny and rationality, Newton set the precedent for further exploration which would eventually lead the rationalists of the time to direct their attention towards social and political problem. But in this regard, Newton’s was mostly a catalyzing influence; more than any other figure, it was John Locke who was responsible for the application of scientific ideas and principles to social and political problems. In his Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690), Locke argued that reason—not faith—accounts for the true source of human knowledge and understanding. Locke’s essay also advanced the concept of the tabula rasa—or “blank mind”—which held that newborn infants are born free of innate influences. Locke believed that the psychology of an individual is determined entirely by environmental factors; an infant born into a rational society would be more likely to develop into a rational individual than one who was born into a superstitious society, for instance. This belief in the role of the environment in determining human characteristics was a truly revolutionary idea. For the budding rationalists and philosophers of the time—already exhilarated by recent scientific advances—Locke’s theory of tabula rasa seemed to imply a potential inroad into meaningful social reform. Society, they believed, could be transformed through the medium of its children; the battle for the future of society could be fought in the early, developing minds of the next generation. Thus, Locke’s theory of tabula rasa served as a crucial moment in inspiring the application of scientific principles toward social ends. In many ways, Locke can be accredited with unleashing the gradual development—stemming, initially, from within the scientific community of the time—of what we would today recognize as the social sciences. But Locke’s influence extended to other areas of social and political experimentation. Apart from his role in bridging the gap between the new methods and concepts unleashed by the Scientific Revolution and their application in social and political matters, Locke’s ideas also had an indirect influence on many of the subsequent social and political reforms carried out during the Enlightenment. In economics, Locke’s influence can be seen in the advent of laissez-faire economics, whose advocates—most notably Adam Smith—based their arguments on the existence of fundamental laws of economics which could be relied upon to produce steady streams of wealth for the benefit of the nation and of the individual. This belief in economic “laws” echoes the belief in natural law central to the Newtonian world-view. But the bridge between Newton’s scientific breakthroughs and their potential applications in economics was made possible by Locke, due to fact that he opened up the realm of the social sciences to the methods of the natural sciences. Legal reforms attempted by the rationalists of the Enlightenment also echoed the legacy of ideas left behind by John Locke. This can be seen in the proposed reforms of Cesare Beccaria, who—on his Essay on Crimes and Punishments (1764)—argued for the existence of natural laws pertaining to the allocation of justice. Beccaria’s desire to introduce a new element of fairness and consistency to the justice system resonates with Locke’s Second Treatise on Government, in which he advanced the pioneering theory of social contract. The essential quality of Locke’s social contract theory is its insistence on the inherent rights of the individual citizen. This revolutionary idea can be seen in the concern for individual rights present in Beccaria’s legal forms, as well as in the increasing concern for individual property ownership and rights to private capital which flourished under the development of liberal economics. But both of these innovations are but small examples of Locke’s vast indirect influence on social and political developments. Indeed, many of the prevailing ideologies which characterize the modern world—from Utilitarianism to the concept of human rights—have in one way or another been shaped by Locke’s influence. More than any other individual of the time, John Locke bridged the gap between the new methods and concepts unleashed by the Scientific Revolution and their application in social and political matters. He effectively directed the rationalists of the time to apply the methods of rationalism towards social and political challenges, aiming—ultimately—at to pursue the perfectibility of human society as a whole. Through this, Locke ignited a wave of social experimentation which continues to this day. <img src="http://spacecollective.org/userdata/tar5w4zB/1346024192/locke.jpg" border="0" width="" height="" align="left" class="padRight"> Image source: <a href="http://text2learnwh.blogspot.ca/2010/11/3-3.html" target="_blank">http://text2learnwh.blogspot.ca/2010/11/3-3.html</a> John Locke did much to encourage the application of scientific methods and ideas to social and political purposes. Through his highly-influential work pertaining to the social contract and to the tabula rasa state into which he believed humans are born, Locke established a new paradigm of thought in which social problems were viewed as unresolved questions which could be answered through the careful application of human reason. Thus, he gave permission to the rationalists of his time—and, indeed, of the subsequent centuries—to attempt to improve and reform (and ultimately, to perfect) human society. Locke’s contributions to social reform would not have been possible without the staggering influence of Isaac Newton, whose work introduced the concept of natural law to the consciousness of Western Civilization, greatly encouraging our culture’s ever-growing fascination with the physical sciences. Newton, in turn, benefitted enormously from the work of René Descartes, who was responsible for no less than the articulation of reason as a distinct and valuable faculty of the human mind. Much as Newton helped establish faith in natural law, Descartes laid the foundation for belief in the existence, reliability, and—above all—the potential of reason. In this way, the ideas of the Scientific Revolution flourished from humble, conceptual origins into a myriad of increasingly-practical applications. What began as an introspective exploration of the nature of human consciousness came to support the development of scientific, social, and political movements and ideas. Collectively, the ideas born from the Scientific Revolution—and expanded upon in subsequent centuries—are responsible for both catalyzing and shaping the course of the modern world. http://spacecollective.org/Apollo/7844/The-Role-of-the-Scientific-Revolution-in-Catalyzing-Social-and-Political-Change-Grade-12-essay-for-AP-History- Hello Again http://spacecollective.org/Apollo/7843/Hello-Again http://spacecollective.org/Apollo/7843/Hello-Again Sun, 26 Aug 2012 16:07:30 +0000 Apollo 7843 My apologies for having dropped off the SC map these past months; I've been occupied with work and other projects, and have therefore had less time to write & post than I would have liked. I have recently launched <a href="http://jvsfernando.blogspot.com" target="_blank">a new blog on the Blogspot platform</a> which deals with similar themes as does my profile on SpaceCollective, but which is intended to reach a wider of audience of friends and acquaintances (Blogspot being much more mainstream than SC). I'll be cross-listing posts on these two platforms, provided their content seems relevant for both. I look forward to re-engaging with this awesome community. Best wishes, Jason http://spacecollective.org/Apollo/7843/Hello-Again Reflections on the Scopes Trial: Questioning the Boundary Between Modernist and Fundamentalist Worldviews http://spacecollective.org/Apollo/7471/Reflections-on-the-Scopes-Trial-Questioning-the-Boundary-Between-Modernist-and-Fundamentalist-Worldviews http://spacecollective.org/Apollo/7471/Reflections-on-the-Scopes-Trial-Questioning-the-Boundary-Between-Modernist-and-Fundamentalist-Worldviews Wed, 04 Apr 2012 00:49:16 +0000 Apollo 7471 <a href="http://www.google.com/imgres?q=the+scopes+trial&hl=en&sa=G&biw=1366&bih=665&gbv=2&tbm=isch&tbnid=xcZYPrnSXax4hM:&imgrefurl=http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scopes_Trial&docid=FYHgQnMJli0R5M&imgurl=http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/thumb/5/54/Scopes_trial.jpg/230px-Scopes_trial.jpg&w=230&h=181&ei=T_x7T5zcDqafiALRht2GDg&zoom=1&iact=hc&vpx=217&vpy=214&dur=30&hovh=144&hovw=184&tx=76&ty=86&sig=106147244520799397559&page=1&tbnh=142&tbnw=177&start=0&ndsp=19&ved=1t:429,r:0,s:0,i:96" target="_blank"><img src="http://spacecollective.org/userdata/tar5w4zB/1333525638/230px-Scopes_trial.jpg" border="0" width="" height="" align="left" class="padRight"></a> <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scopes_Trial" target="_blank"><cap>Clarence Darrow (left) and William Jennings Bryan chat in court during the Scopes Trial.</cap></a> In 1925, high school teacher John T. Scopes was tried by the state of Tennessee for violating the now-infamous Butler Act, a law which outlawed the teaching of evolution in public schools. What transpired in the trial seems, at first glance, like a relatively straightforward debate between prosecution and defense. However, when one investigates the unstated premises of their legal arguments, one discovers that they are founded upon radically different philosophical values. In this manner, the debate between prosecution and defense in the Scopes trial is, in essence, a debate between fundamentalist and modernist worldviews. Yet here too, appearances can be misleading. In first approaching the differences in philosophy which separate modernism from fundamentalism, I was struck by the sheer depth of disagreement which divides them. Their values seem in many ways to be the inverse images of each-other. Yet the starkness of this divide was itself intriguing to me. I began to question whether the separation between these two worldviews was perhaps an indication of some common ancestry, that the two may share—at the root of their divergence as ideas—a common origin. In pursuing this question, I have produced no answers. Rather, my intention in writing this paper is to direct my reader through three stages of questioning, each building upon the one before. The first of these stages relates to the legal arguments put forward in the trial, and is rooted in textual support from the trial itself. The second is concerned with the unstated philosophies which underlie the legal arguments of prosecution and defense, and is based primarily on my own subjective inference. The third and final stage of my analysis is concerned with the raising of a question: are the modernist and fundamentalist perspectives truly separate, or are they united at the source? <img src="http://spacecollective.org/userdata/tar5w4zB/1333524945/darrowquestionswjbs.jpg" border="0" width="" height="" class="padTopBot"> <a href="http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/scopes/evolut.htm" target="_blank"><cap>Darrow questions Bryan during the Scopes Trial (July 20, 1925) (Smithsonian)</cap></a> The legal argument of the prosecution is based on three key premises. First and foremost, the prosecution argues that “the legislature of the state of Tennessee… [has a right] to control the public school system”, and that “in the passage of [the Butler Act] the legislature abused no discretion, but used only the reasonable means at hand” (86-87). They assume, in short, that the Butler Act, which outlawed the teaching of evolution in public schools, is constitutional. Second, they assume that the theory of evolution is fundamentally incompatible with the account of creation contained in the Bible. Third, the prosecution asserts that the case relates only to whether or not the law in question was broken, and that any questioning of the legitimacy of the law itself is not relevant to the trial at hand (109). If one assumes these premises to be true, then the trial of John Scopes can be reasonably seen as a simple matter of law-enforcement: Scopes broke the law by teaching evolution in a public school, and he should therefore be punished. If, however, one does not assume these premises to be true, then the situation becomes much more complicated. It is for precisely this reason that the argument of the defense is considerably more complex than that of the prosecution. The defense rightly recognizes that the argument put forward by the prosecution is indeed logical insofar as its statements follow logically from its premises. They choose, therefore, to focus their attention on the premises themselves. For if one can overturn the premises of an argument, then the broader argument must fall as well. The defense applies this strategy by questioning the constitutionality of the Butler Act. In doing so, they begin by arguing that the vagueness of the Act’s language places an unreasonable burden on the high school teachers whom it seeks to regulate: the law makes reference to “the story of the divine creation of man as taught in the Bible”, and yet there is considerable theological debate—both historically and at present—over the way in which that story can or should be interpreted. Similarly, the law makes it illegal to teach “that man has descended from a lower order of animals”, which—as a reference to evolutionary theory—is also imprecise, due to the way in which scientific theories must perpetually shift to accommodate new evidence (90). From the defense’s perspective, “[the demands of the law are] so uncertain and impossible that every man must be sure that he has read everything in the Bible and not only read it but understands it, or he might violate the criminal code” (90). Secondly, the defense holds that the Butler Act gives undue preference to Christian beliefs. The law seeks to protect “the teaching [of] the theory of creation, as taught in the Bible, and [excludes] under penalty of the law any other theory of creation” (85). The defense argues that “to base a theory set forth in any version of the Bible to be taught in the public school is an invasion of the rights of the citizen… [b]ecause it imposes a religious opinion” (86). By giving legal preference to one religion over another, the defense argues that the law violates religious freedoms. In addition to attacking the questioning the constitutionality of the Butler Act , the defense also employs a secondary argument. They contend that “to convict Scopes the prosecution must prove that Scopes not only taught the theory of evolution, but that he also, and at the same time, denied the theory of creation as set forth in the Bible” (102). The defense rejects the notion that the act of teaching evolution is itself an act of contradicting the teachings of the Bible. Rather, they claim that “there is no conflict with science and Christianity”, stating that “science occupies a field of learning separate and apart from the learning of theology which the clergy expound” (102). Furthermore, they intend to defend this claim through the testimony of biologists and theologians, who—they argue—should be brought into trial as “expert witnesses” (102). While these arguments appear straightforward on the surface, they mask a broader philosophical debate between fundamentalist and modernist perspectives on the role of science in society, and on the effects of scientific inquiry on morality. In analyzing these philosophical differences, I will begin by unpacking the argument of the prosecution, and will then move on to that of the defense. I stated earlier that the argument of the prosecution assumes the legality of the Butler Act, and views the trial as a simple case of law-enforcement. Yet this assumption carries with it a set of deeper and more powerful beliefs. To begin with, the prosecution’s belief in the legality of the Butler Act touches on a central conflict between the authority of the majority and the authority of truth. From the fundamentalist perspective, the only form of knowledge which is considered to be “holy” is that of revelation: the word of God. Revealed knowledge, such as the story of Genesis in the Bible, originates not from a human source but from a divine one, and this distinction lends it special privilege in the workings of human life—namely, its exclusion from the whims of the majority. All other forms of truth, including that of empirical knowledge, result merely from the activities of humans and not the revelation of God, and reside—therefore—under the rightful jurisdiction of humankind. A second crucial element of the philosophy underlying the argument of the prosecution relates to the effects of rationality on moral behaviour. The prosecution’s desire to defend the outlawing of evolution in the public school curriculum allows us to infer three elements of their philosophy: 1) That the human spirit, if left without guidance, is prone to immoral acts. 2) That the means of remedying this behaviour is through the inculcation of religious faith; that faith, in tempering the influence of our innate (immoral natures) and introducing a code of morality in its place, promotes moral behaviour. 3) That reason, through its ceaseless inquiries, undermines our confidence in faith and moral norms, thus bringing us closer to our original state of immorality. From the perspective of a Christian fundamentalist, the foundation of moral behaviour in society is the Judeo-Christian ethic as put forth in the Bible. If one assumes this to be true, then any theory which could undermine faith in the authority of the Bible would necessarily threaten moral behaviour as well. In the worldview of the modernist, reason takes the place of faith. This is true on every level of the modernist philosophy, beginning with its regard for reason as the preferred qualifier of truth. Within the modernist worldview, knowledge is deemed truthful if it stands up to the scrutiny of the mind; the authority of the modernist is not the truth as revealed by God, but the truth as revealed by rational inquiry. It is the mind, not the soul—reason, not faith—which forms the bedrock of the modernist worldview. It is not surprising, then, that this high regard for reason would have implications for the treatment of scientific knowledge in society. Scientific knowledge, for the modernist, takes on a sort of “sacredness” owing to its being the product of a rational process. Just as the fundamentalist feels compelled to protect the word of God as contained in the Bible, the modernist is instinctively compelled to protect scientific knowledge, the sacred fruit of empirical inquiry. These contrary views regarding religious and scientific paradigms of “truth” are on clear display in the trial of John Scopes, in which both sides struggle to defend the sanctity of their respective truth paradigms: Genesis for the prosecution, evolution for the defense. The modernists also have a drastically different perspective on morality and its relationship to reason and religious faith, one which is in many ways a mirror-image of the fundamentalist perspective. For the modernist, reason—not faith—is the greatest antidote to immoral behaviour. Indeed it could be argued that the modernist perspective here is in many ways more optimistic than that of the fundamentalists, as it seems to suggest a higher regard for the intrinsic potential of the human being. Unlike the fundamentalists, the modernists believe that humans can utilize their reasoning capacity as a means of bettering themselves both morally and intellectually—that the betterment of the human race is best achieved through the use and cultivation of the human spirit and intellect via rational inquiry, rather than through its suppression via faith. While one can defend the merits of the scientific process and emphasize the ways in which it is distinct from religious faith, there is nevertheless one substantial and enduring similarity, a depth into which faith ultimately and invariably enters. If one looks at the foundations of science, one finds the process of empirical investigation, the trust in rationality. Yet on what basis is this trust truly placed? Can one say "empirical knowledge"? This is a circular argument, for what qualifies empiricism as "rational" if not its reliance on empirical observation? Similarly, what qualifies "empirical observation" as trustworthy apart from its characterization as "rational" or “reliable”? We trust these things, but we do not know why. Perhaps our reason for trusting them runs deeper and has more external/empirical support than is the case with religious faith, but ultimately our situation is much the same. The basis for our modern trust in rationality stems from an inspiration, an intuition, a trust in its virtue, which we cannot ultimately argue for. It exists, it is undeniable, it is contained within the joyful feeling of every discovery, every exploration, every successful (or, indeed, unsuccessful) application of the rational mind. Yet we cannot account for it; that spark of inspiration which tells us "Yes" to the method of the mind cannot be traced to the perception of our eyes, or to our ears, or to our instruments. It eludes our detection, while inspiring our beliefs and our actions. How so, then, are we truly different from the religious fundamentalists, the believers, those who place their trust, faith and joy in their belief in an undetectable God. Undetectable, yes, but deeply knowable all the same. Felt in the very fabric of their practice, as with ours. We cannot quantify that spark which lies at the center of our trust in science. This leaves us with a question to which the wise man should be humble: in relation to faith, is our distinction from religion one of nature, or degree? These profound philosophical questions are further explored by Walter Lippman in his 1928 publication, American Inquisitors. In it, he offers his reflections on the Scopes trial, which he views as being but an iteration “of a wide conflict between scholarship and popular faith, between freedom of thought and popular rule” which symbolizes “the ancient conflict between freedom and authority” (Lippman 6, 8). He wonders whether “at the core of [the trial] there is not something of great importance which it behooves us to understand”, and proceeds to lead us on an effort to explore this line of questioning through the form of an imaginary Socratic dialogue between Socrates, Thomas Jefferson, and William Jennings Bryan (8). In keeping with his historical reputation, Socrates is used by Lippman as a mouthpiece through which to deconstruct the arguments of Jefferson and Bryan, so as to reveal their underlying premises. This process of deconstruction eventually arrives at a discussion on the nature of “divine revelation” as contrasted with “human reason”, a line of inquiry first initiated by Socrates’ reference to science as “the religion of rationalism” (19). The character of Socrates raises the point that, within the social framework of the United States, the unquestioned authority of “divine revelation”—“God’s Word”—has slowly given way to a new order, one in which the authority of rationality has become paramount. What is it, Socrates asks, that “makes [one] so confident about human reason?” (40). This powerful question touches on an central issue which permeates Lippman’s text: on what basis has reason come to dethrone revelation as the foremost qualifier of truth, and how do these two concepts—seemingly so at odds with one another—actually differ? Revelation or reason? “God’s Word” or “human words”? Which Word do we trust more, and why? The archetypal modernist might argue that, through reason, we transcribe the language of nature in such a way that we may understand it directly. This, they might argue, is the true ‘Word of God’. The archetypal fundamentalist may respond to this argument with the simple phrase, “The proper study of Mankind is Man”. That is to say, they may argue that divine revelation—not reason—is the true Word of God, due to the fact that Man is the (truest) manifestation of nature (mankind created in God’s own image). Therefore, the empirical method of science, with its assumption that truth is to be discovered through the unfurling of nature, is not consistent with its own philosophy: if Truth (see: God) is to be found in Nature, and if Man is derived from Nature, then whatever “Truth” that exists in nature should also exist in Man. But here we are not talking simply of the purely physical/empirical dimension of humanity; Man is a singularly complex organism, one whose experience includes faculties (cognition, emotion, inspiration, indeed reason itself) cannot be fundamentally quantified. It is here, at the boundary-point between quantifiable and unquantifiable phenomena, that the scientific/rational and spiritual/religious perspectives invariably diverge: the scientific/empirical mind stays bound within the paradigm of the quantifiable, while the spiritual/religious mind moves beyond that which can be quantified, into the realm of feelings, emotions, and inspiration, that realm of which language is born, and to which it can never fully return . And it is precisely here, past the threshold of the unquantifiable, that it discerns the Word of God. It is not difficult for one to observe that at the bedrock of all religious questioning and experience lies the concept of God. It is comparatively more difficult to identify the equivalent concept which underpins and unifies the domain of rationality. It is easy enough to point to the workings of the rational mind; it is pervasive throughout contemporary culture. But it is not the identification of rational behaviour—of rationality put to use—that is the challenge; rather, what we must set out to uncover is the root of such behaviour. We seek, then, the face of reason itself. It may well be the case that reason—the thing itself—cannot be bound into words. Yet, anticipating this potential shortfall, let us at least try to shed light on reason by way of its accompanying characteristics, so that—much like with a stenciled image—its inner form may appear, if only as the negative impression which emerges through the exposition of its immediate surroundings. What is Reason? Can it be seen? Can it be heard? Can it—in its intrinsic, elementary form—be discerned, in any way whatsoever, by the senses? It cannot. We must conclude, therefore, that it is unquantifiable, and fails to meet the necessary prerequisites for empirical investigation. It cannot be empirically witnessed, and therefore it cannot be empirically verified. The existence or non-existence of reason is unfalsifiable; it cannot be accounted for by the empirical methodology of science. And yet, despite all of these observations, it is evident that reason is pervasive throughout our lives. We recognize the relative rationality or irrationality of human behaviour, we employ rationality as the very basis on which we evaluate claims to truth, and yet the basic, most fundamental definition of reason eludes our rational understanding. We must conclude that reason is visible only through its manifestations. Indeed, in explaining this difficult and paradoxical situation, one might to tempted to explain the issue by simply stating—indeed, quite truthfully—that “Reason works in mysterious ways”. In recalling the initial prompt of these investigations—the question of whether divine revelation and human reason are, in fact, fundamentally distinct—we would be wise to take notice of the fact that, if one were to substitute the word “God” for “Reason” in the preceding phrase, one would be left with perhaps the most common explanation of God as given by religious believers. It is only a small minority of rationalists who focus their attention on the question of how to conceive of the basic identity or definition of reason itself. Indeed, very few go so far as to acknowledge the existence of such a question. Such rare individuals occupy a unique and wholly valuable perspective in relation to the science-religion cultural divide, as they are capable of experiencing firsthand that elementary foundation of rationality—reason as an entity unto itself—at a level more fundamental than that at which the empirical methods of scientific inquiry may operate. Such individuals transcend the restrictive dogmatism of both religious and scientific orthodoxies; they emerge, instead, upon a truly secular spiritual experience. Albert Einstein encapsulated this rich perspective in his 1949 publication, The World as I see It: <blockquote>It was the experience of mystery—even if mixed with fear—that engendered religion. A knowledge of the existence of something we cannot penetrate, of the manifestations of the profoundest reason and the most radiant beauty, which are only accessible to our reason in their most elementary forms—it is this knowledge and this emotion that constitute the truly religious attitude; in this sense, and in this alone, I am a deeply religious man.</blockquote> Such perspectives have emerged from both sides of the science-religion divide. Rudolf Otto, an eminent Protestant theologian of his time, profoundly impacted 20th century German theology through his 1917 publication, The Idea of the Holy. In its foreword, Otto states that his intention is to explore “that which may be called ‘non-rational’ or ‘supra-rational’ in the depths of the divine nature.” Furthermore, he acknowledges the paradoxical nature of rationality—that is, one’s inability to apply the rational mind toward the task of uncovering the nature of rationality itself. Otto refers to this intrinsic, natural form of rationality as “the rational aspect of that supreme Reality we call ‘God’”. In his opening chapter, titled ‘The Rational and the Non-Rational’, Otto argues against the “commonly asserted… [notion] that Rationalism is the denial, and its opposite the affirmation, of the miraculous”. This, he argues, “is manifestly a wrong or at least a very superficial distinction” (Otto 3). Otto coins the term numinous to refer to the human experience of that which is holy. What is notable about Otto’s use of this term is that it is applied not only with regard to theistic entities such as God(s), but also to a broader spectrum of human experience, one which is deeply compatible with the concept of secular spirituality. Otto uses this concept of the numinous to introduce a secondary term, that of the mysterium tremendum. Otto defines this term as referring to the feeling of profound awe and exaltation which one feels when one is “[i]n the presence of that which is a Mystery inexpressible and above all creatures” (13). <a href="http://www.google.com/imgres?q=einstein&hl=en&sa=G&biw=1366&bih=665&gbv=2&tbm=isch&tbnid=0Bd4RMD8-c2QYM:&imgrefurl=http://th.physik.uni-frankfurt.de/~jr/physpiceinstein.html&docid=jFz7KZ1ctsRd7M&imgurl=http://th.physik.uni-frankfurt.de/~jr/gif/phys/einst_7.jpg&w=460&h=480&ei=6fp7T7TeCurYiAKt0vXHDQ&zoom=1&iact=hc&vpx=418&vpy=169&dur=810&hovh=229&hovw=220&tx=136&ty=88&sig=106147244520799397559&page=1&tbnh=137&tbnw=128&start=0&ndsp=24&ved=1t:429,r:2,s:0,i:139" target="_blank"> <img src="http://spacecollective.org/userdata/tar5w4zB/1333525242/einst_7.jpg" border="0" width="" height="" align="left" class="padRight"> <a href="http://www.google.com/imgres?q=rudolph+otto&hl=en&sa=G&biw=1366&bih=665&gbv=2&tbm=isch&tbnid=qDMGGRuDzXR53M:&imgrefurl=http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rudolf_Otto&docid=kRJAIonps_rqIM&imgurl=http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/e/e4/RudolfOtto.jpg&w=192&h=300&ei=f_t7T6S8DoWxiQL6rei1DQ&zoom=1&iact=hc&vpx=188&vpy=133&dur=1719&hovh=240&hovw=153&tx=62&ty=116&sig=106147244520799397559&page=1&tbnh=147&tbnw=96&start=0&ndsp=27&ved=1t:429,r:0,s:0,i:69" target="_blank"><img src="http://spacecollective.org/userdata/tar5w4zB/1333525521/RudolfOtto.jpg" border="0" width="" height="" align="right" class="padLeft"></a> What is particularly notable of Otto’s views is the extent to which they coincide with the perspective on spirituality expressed in Einstein’s text. These two wholly distinct individuals, in pursuing their respective philosophies to the furthest reaches of their rational minds, arrived upon what is in essence a singular and unifying conclusion: at the bedrock of all human inquiry—whether approached through rationality or through revelation—there exists a dimension of “Mystery”, of “the most radiant beauty”, that is “only accessible to our reason in [its] most elementary forms” (Otto 13; Einstein). These views, united as they are despite the dramatic cultural differences of their authors, provide us with a conceptual alternative to the binary opposition between Modernist and Fundamentalist ideologies with which we are confronted in The Scopes Trial. In examining the philosophical foundations of the modernist and fundamentalist worldviews, one finds that these two camps are perhaps more similar than may be comfortable for us to believe. In a world where the divisions between ‘rationality’ and ‘irrationality’ are becoming increasingly entrenched, we would be wise to examine—with courage and open minds—the extent to which our respective ideologies may have grown from common soil. Perhaps, while our methods differ, our subject matter is the same. “The exploration of the cosmos is a voyage of self-discovery.” “We are a way for the cosmos to know itself.” —Carl Sagan Works Cited Moran, Jeffrey P. The Scopes Trial: A Brief History with Documents. Boston: Bedford/St. Martin's, 2002. Print Lippman, Walter. A Commentary on Dayton and Chicago. New York: Macmillan, 1928. Print. Einstein, Albert. "The World as I See It." The World as I See It. New York: Philosophical Library, 1949. Print. Otto, Rudolf. The Idea of the Holy. Trans. John W. Harvey. London: Oxford UP. Rudolph Otto: The Idea of the Holy. Scribd. Web. 18 Mar. 2012. . Sagan, Carl. "The Backbone of Night." Cosmos: A Personal Voyage. Dir. Adrian Malone. Prod. Gregory Andorfer and Rob McCain. PBS. 28 Sept. 1980. Television. Sagan, Carl. "Who Speaks for Earth.” Cosmos: A Personal Voyage. Dir. Adrian Malone. Prod. Gregory Andorfer and Rob McCain. PBS. 28 Sept. 1980. Television.</a> http://spacecollective.org/Apollo/7471/Reflections-on-the-Scopes-Trial-Questioning-the-Boundary-Between-Modernist-and-Fundamentalist-Worldviews A Love Supreme http://spacecollective.org/Apollo/7022/A-Love-Supreme http://spacecollective.org/Apollo/7022/A-Love-Supreme Mon, 29 Aug 2011 17:23:38 +0000 Apollo 7022 Part One: Elation The city seemed to move—swelling, as though engrossed and enraptured by its own primal rhythm. People, shapes—figures and cascading blurs wrapped among themselves—drifted and were shook apart as though figments of some imaginary lightplay, distant memories of a fleeting and forgotten past. His mind lingered and fell into the crowd. Shapeless figures, structures, bodies, minds; a ceaseless intermingling of beginnings and ends, of unspoken thoughts and voiceless passions, the epicenter of some distant sanctuary, the birthplace of idols of that vastest of pantheons, the workings and doings of creation. And from this place, he woke. Under the arid sky of the metropolis, a network of winding tributaries buzzes with the frantic energy of humanity and its works. Man-made shadows drift over the figures of nameless forms, who fall into the cracks and passage ways of this self-containing sprawl, cast in the all-enveloping shadow of immense and brooding forms. Inside, a man sits waking in a char. He stares forward, his face in his palms, gripping at himself with the inward fascination of a man still dreaming. His tactile senses point him to the imagining of a distant world, a lifeless planet on which his facial features mark the contours of a barren land—his nose: great ridges; his cheeks: an empty plane. He can feel the light of its distant sun, illuminating its arid fields, its lifeless deserts, warming and stirring the planet within. Above him, the still-closed window stands brimming with the conductive sheen of frigid glass, illuminating the blue-lit room with the blurred shapes and contours of an imaginary Beyond. Beyond the window, vast columns pierce the sky in tight-knit regiments, a phalanx of metal and glass stretching outwardly beyond the comprehension of the eye. Beneath them, a vast maze-work of streets and pathways roar with the cumulative rush of feverish motions. The coldness of the glass runs through his cheek and down his spine, sending a nervous pulse of energy running outward through his body. The noise of city is muffled through the glass, its constant bass-tones resting in the space within his chest, a sinking presence, everywhere, rippling from the core. His mind echoes inwardly with the rippling of ceaseless machinations. Hours later, he walked among the labyrinthine passageways of the city’s streets. Dazzling lightplay reflected from the sunlit husks of the monolithic buildings, as a cold flux of movement enveloped the fast-moving grounds. People, everywhere, rushed in accelerating movements, their bodies in unison—a network of transient forms. He watched these figures with an unreflecting gaze, his mind staring blankly at the ceaseless flow of moving bodies. He watched their forms meld into one another—trading spaces and occupying moments—until he could no longer trace the lines connecting the beginnings and the endings of their movements; all had become a blur of simple motion. Something, invisibly, had occupied his thoughts. He stopped moving. A subtle sound, of sands lifted and rising, whispered outwardly from the surroundings as though spurred by the warming influence of a distant sun. There was no visible source, no identifiable force of agency on which to attach the sound. Just the rhythm, which—building upon itself as though swept by a gust of spontaneity, of vacancy of form—was punctuated by a central point of sonic pressure erupting into a singular multitude, a divergent evolution of sounds. He stood transfixed and watching the fast-moving forms. That night, the city commenced its descent into an uneasy slumber. Faceless shadows stalked the streets, the exhausted dregs of the day’s activities, lost in the kaleidoscopic matrix of their wandering minds. This was the sleepless nightmare, the side effect of the chronic pace of the city’s movements. He watched at a distance as the ceaseless energy of their elongated days slowly gave way to the encroaching tide of madness and decay. Their broken minds wandered the streets, pursued by their bodies. This was the breaking point, populated by those who no longer sought the dawn, but instead paced evenly through the city streets, their dormant memories weighing heavily on their still-born minds, marching helplessly amidst the darkness. He observed one of them in a park overlooking a large body of water which stretched out and reached the blackened horizon. Its surface glistened with a multitude of miniscule, moonlit flourishes, rising and falling in cyclical motions atop the still, rolling waves, which drifted easefully amongst themselves—unmoved by the silent forces whose currents swirled dormant and invisible beneath their depths. Something old and powerful—direct and inevitable—lingered stalkingly behind the stunning symmetry of his eyes. And yet, buried deep within the powers of its reaching grasp, its wrestless longing to be felt and heard, beat the heart and soul of non-power itself. With these eyes, he stared ever-forward, passing slowly and evenly over the horizon, illuminated by the lightplay of distant waves, the ink-black darkness of the sky whose star-lit luminescence bore the portent mystery of an infinite expanse, an unceasing frontier beyond which there can be no further imagination: the boundary-point of ponderings, of measurements, of Knowing itself. His gray eyes danced with the quantum interplay of innumerable photons, as he sat transfixedly, staring into the beyond. Part Two: Elegance He awoke once more to the sound of that undying pulse. The light of the sky—cold, but not dim—cast a softened halo atop the streets’ blue shadows. Waking, he stirred. His eyes caught the soft glow reaching outward from the window. In the shower, water poured over him in sheets and layers, clusters of moist particles, self-containing harbingers of a vastness of prospective tomorrows, fusing and exploding in pockets of energy—an accelerating symphony of matter, manifest. The walls, tiles, fabrics of discarded clothing, all carriers of that sacred message, expressions of that pulse whose sound holds the birth-weight of innumerable worlds. He sat and gathered his thoughts. Beneath the surface, his home was founded on a bedrock of faceless artefacts: photographs, human records—shadows and distant dignitaries of a bygone world. He sought solace in their shadows, their fleeting gaze and displaced meanings, which floated, groundless, deprived of a world. They are lost seeds with no soil to bear witness to their relevance: formless apparitions devoid of a context, place, or time. He started at the photographs, and his eyelids quivered as though swayed by a distant wind. Part Three: Exaltation That night he dreamed of spectral illuminations, images bursting through the floodgates of his fast-opening mind. Fire, fire, coaxed by wood and rock, by scraps of shrubbery, dried wood fragments, leaves, crushed with boulders, moulded by hands, twisted and raised, sputtering from the smouldering Earth; he saw animals slain by men and scarred fields interspersed with rows of pooling water; he saw stones being stripped from the sides of colossal mountains, the movement of boulders by great lines of forms; he saw cities of wood and cities of stone, cities of marble heat-warped beneath the searing energy of a vibrant sun; he saw steam rising from the banks of rivers; vast migrations, their ranks stretched for miles; he saw the movements of millions as though driven by a sound, marching in unison, coordinated movement, driven by the pulse. He was caught in the elementary graspings of that all-encompassing sound, echoing and resounding in the corridors perception. His ears filled with the formation of words, distant utterances heralding the genesis of language, as the birth-song of evolution rushed powerfully through his veins. He heard voices in unison, rising and falling, but converging on the pulse. He felt it ricocheting and rebounding off of figures, thoughts, and dreams: a unifying message articulated in a single, all-pervading sound whose body seemed to move and glisten—perpetually shifting, eternally in flux—with all the motion and energy of creation itself. From the unknowable ether of his mind’s eye, his city appeared. It breathed with a life and energy unknown to itself. Its people, broken and darting through its thoughtless streets, appeared hopeless and unknowing beneath an immensity of sky, permeated by wind. This sky, this wind, the colour of their eyes as they paced unseeingly about the city’s long passageways—all combined to illuminate what had been a shallow armour, the unloving resemblance of a civilization which had once arisen—with passion and sacrifice—from the fertile soils of the Earth. Their presence carried with it the semblance of a bygone time, of a force of energy whose workings transcended the boundaries of rational forms. Their bodies—moving, unmoving—traced the contours of a once-vibrant paradigm whose structure had collapsed under the weight of its own creation, its own deliberations and wrongdoings, its excesses and secret passions and the hidden weight and terror of its vast, internal void. The city stood radiant beneath an open sky. And from this place, he woke. http://spacecollective.org/Apollo/7022/A-Love-Supreme